VESELÝ, Š., DOHNAL, M.: Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model. Acta univ. agric. et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2012, LX, No. 4, pp. 397-406 The paper presents a simple formalized qualitative model of government tenders (GTs). Qualitative models use just three values: Positive/Increasing, Zero/Constant and Negative/Decreasing. Such quantifi ers of trends are the least information intensive. Qualitative models can be useful, since GT evaluation o en includes such goals as e.g. effi ciency of public purchasing, and variables as e.g. availability of relevant information or subjectivity of judgment, that are diffi cult to quantify. Hence, a signifi cant fraction of available information about GTs is not of numerical nature, e.g. if availability of relevant information is decreasing then effi ciency of public purchasing is decreasing as well. Such equationless relations are studied in this paper. A qualitative model of the function F(Goals, Variables) is developed. The model has four goal functions, eight variables, and 39 equationless relations. The model is solved and seven solutions, i.e. scenarios are obtained. All qualitative states, including fi rst and second qualitative derivatives with respect to time, of all variables are specifi ed for each scenario. Any unsteady state behavior of the GT model is described by its transitional oriented graph. There are eight possible transitions among seven scenarios. No a priori knowledge of qualitative modeling is required on the reader's part. government tenders, decision making, multidimensional, scenarios, qualitative model
INTRODUCTION
Models and research frameworks of government tenders (GTs) are usually simplifi ed or quite specifi c, see e.g. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) , Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) , Auriol (2006) , Van Long and Stähler (2009) , Pomazalová and Korecki (2011) . That is, they include only a few variables (for example Celentani and Ganuza, 2002 , include price, quality, corruption and two measures of competitiveness) and/or exclude variables that are diffi cult to measure (e.g. the infl uence of informal ground rules, bureaucratic hierarchies, subjective judgment and biased decision making).
These specifi c, quantitative models and theories of GTs are meaningful, but in reality there are many problems and infl uences (variables) of diff erent nature related to GTs and some of them are diffi cult to observe and measure with precision (e.g. corruption -see Treisman, 2000 ; biases to favor some off ers, expert arbitrage -see Khan and Schroder, 2009 ; compliance to rules -see Edwards and Wolfe, 2005) , which makes the development of generally applicable, i.e. multidimensional models diffi cult. All these problems (multidimensionality, diff erent nature of included variables, and measurement diffi culties) are encountered in evaluations of specifi c, individual GTs, too (e.g. Pongpeng and Liston, 2003) . However, in the present study we focus on a more general level of GTs evaluation, i.e. the objective functions and independent variables included into our model are relevant to a broad spectrum of GTs, rather than to any particular GT.
Formalized qualitative modeling is utilized to describe processes and systems (such as GTs) that, because of their complexity, do not allow or render diffi cult and costly the development of conventional quantitative models in a form of a set of equations followed by a statistical identifi cation of constants, see e.g. Keesman (2011) .
The task of the present paper is therefore to outline a multidimensional formalized qualitative model of factors infl uencing GTs decision making, including some factors that are hard to measure. GTs decision making represents a relatively ill-known, nonlinear and multidimensional system. Such systems are, by their very nature, diffi cult to observe/ measure. One of the main reasons for qualitative GTs model development is therefore information shortage (for instance when only qualitative data are available), see e.g. Hurme et al. (1993) , Vícha and Dohnal (2008b) .
Information shortage can be eliminated by additional information sources including additional observations, which is time consuming and costly, or by utilization of such information items (i.e. qualitative data) which cannot be easily treated by conventional formal tools. For example Khan and Schroder (2009) studied several diffi cult to measure variables (such as the use of informal decision procedures, compliance to rules, contradictions in rules, and biases to favor some off ers) in the context of GTs. Their approach was mostly descriptive in nature, they employed interviews and semantic diff erential scales.
In this study, we propose a general methodological framework that enables incorporation of many even relatively vague and diverse determinants of GTs decision making.
Qualitative reasoning has been used in some form to model, for instance, complex engineering systems (e.g. Hurme et al., 1993) , investment decisions and economic problems (e.g. Benaroch and Dhar, 1995; Hinkkanen et al., 2003; Luňáček and Martinovičová, 2010) and various chaotic systems Dohnal, 2008a, 2008b ); see Bourseau et al. (1995 ), De Jong (2004 and Price et al. (2006) for an overview.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2. describes the method of qualitative modeling -the most important properties of qualitative models are defi ned in subsection 2.1, subsection 2.2 deals with qualitative vector optimization (which is instrumental for development and interpretation of the scenarios presented in subsection 3.2) and subsection 2.3 deals with transition graphs. In section 3. results for the GT model are given and discussed. Section 4. concludes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Qualitative models
There are only three qualitative values, positive, zero or negative, for details see e.g. Dohnal (1991) , Vícha and Dohnal (2008a) . A qualitative scenario of a qualitative model is specifi ed if all its n qualitative variables X  (X 1 , X 2 , …, X n ) are described by the qualitative triplets (X, DX, DDX), where DX and DDX are the fi rst qualitative and second qualitative derivatives with respect to time.
Let us suppose that the triplet:
represents price P(t) as a function of time. It means that the price P is positive (P = + (3) A formal interpretation of the above mentioned qualitative knowledge items (2), (3) is
where DY/DX is the fi rst qualitative derivative with respect to X and DDY/DDX is the second derivative. Typical examples of these relations are given in Fig. 1 .
The identifi cation numbers given in Fig 
Qualitative vector optimization
Let us suppose that there are two independent variables X 1 , X 2 and two objective functions Q 1 , Q 2 . For example the fi rst objective function is Profi t and the second is Safety. Because of their very nature both objective functions must be maximized:
There is a vector F of constraints represented by a set of equationless relations:
Let us presuppose that the unknown qualitative model (7) has the following set of three solutions (scenarios):
Since we want Q 1 and Q 2 to be maximized, see (6), the fi rst qualitative solution, see (8) -scenario no. 1, is highly undesirable, because both objective functions decrease if independent variables X 1 and X 2 follow the qualitative pattern given in scenario no. 1 in (8). Therefore the qualitative behavior of independent variables X 1 and X 2 X 1 X 2 +++ +++ (9) is bad with respect to the maximization of two objective functions Q 1 and Q 2 (see (6)).
If there would be a set of scenarios which contain, for example, the following solution then the scenario (10) is highly desirable because this scenario maximizes both objective functions in the best possible way, i.e. both second derivatives are positive.
It is not the goal of this paper to study the algorithm how to solve qualitative models, i.e. how the so ware selects/rejects scenarios. It is a combinatorial problem. The most trivial algorithm is based on systematic confrontation of all possible n-dimensional triplets (e.g. ++−, ++0, +0+) for each variable and the model itself. This type of solution is called brutal force in artifi cial intelligence. For more details see e.g. Trave-Massuyes et al. (2004) , Dohnal (2008a, 2008b) . For details on vector optimization see Jahn (2004) .
Transitions among qualitative scenarios
Any unsteady state behaviors of a system can be described by a time sequence of its scenarios. If each scenario is represented by a node and all transitions are graphically represented by oriented arcs between the corresponding pairs of scenarios, the result is an oriented graph of all possible transitions.
A transitional graph G is an oriented graph. Its nodes are the set of scenarios S and oriented arcs are the transitions T. The set of transitions T can be easily generated by the corresponding set of scenarios S using Tab. I. A complete set of all possible one dimensional transitions is given in Tab. I.
For example the third line of Tab. I indicates that it is possible to transfer the triplet (++−) into the triplet (+0−) (see (1)). This transition is not the only possible. There are two more possible transitions. Namely to (+0−) and to (+00). Tab. I is not a dogma. It could be modifi ed on ad hoc basis. The only requirement is that the transitions must satisfy the common sense reasoning of a user.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
GT decision making can be characterized by the following set of twelve variables (11), eight independent variables (12) and four objective functions (13).
Objective functions:
EPP Effi ciency of Public Purchasing
-see e.g. Talluri and Narasimhan (2003) , Lorentziadis (2010) EPP can be simply defi ned as the total price the bidder (the government) pays for the procured good or service (with the quality of the purchased good/ service hold constant). The higher the price, the lower EPP.
INV Investors' Rating of the Government
-see e.g. Busse and Hefeker (2006) , Dassiou and Stern (2009) INV expresses opinions investors hold about a government's trustworthiness and reliability. For example: is the government trustworthy -if yes, INV goes up. Will the procurement process be fair -if yes, INV goes up. Will the government pay its debtsif yes, INV goes up. There are several methodologies for rating countries and companies. However, INV can also have a form of just a "feeling" an investor has about the government's trustworthiness. Note that trust is vital for maintaining benefi cial relationships (e.g. Coleman, 1994) .
BIA Biases to Favor Some Off ers
-see e.g. Khan and Schroder (2009), Lorentziadis (2010) Variable BIA indicates the relative proportion of biased decisions (e.g. due to a confl ict of interest, bribes and/or erroneous processing) as compared to fair, unbiased decisions. Various measurement methodologies are possible: the proportion of clearly biased and/or dubious individual decisions can be measured, alternatively it is possible to express this variable in monetary terms.
COR Corruption
-see e.g. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) , Auriol (2006) Following Treisman (2000) we defi ne corruption as misuse of public offi ce for private gains. Bribery is typically involved.
(11) Independent variables:
CON Control Rules
-see e.g. Kovacic (1992) , Straub (2009) Control rules prohibit and regulate certain actions. High values of CON indicate well defi ned and implemented control rules and therefore good control, low values of CON indicate insuffi cient control rules and lack of control. Effi cient functioning of control mechanisms requires that the supervising agency be independent of the supervised agency (e.g. Stern and Holder, 1999) .
DIC Contradictions in Rules, i.e. Level of Inconsistencies
-see e.g. Khan and Schroder (2009) Procedural and decision rules that prescribe how the procurement process should proceed might be dispersed in several formal (as well as informal) sources. When this is the case, some of the sources might contradict each other (variable DIC increases) -enabling divergent interpretations of what is allowed (recommended) in the GT.
EXP Expert Arbitrage
-see e.g. Khan and Schroder (2009) Expert arbitrage (EXP) represents the infl uence of independent expert opinion as compared to political/bureaucratic opinion in the decision process. When expert arbitrage is high, experts can dispute and overrule decisions of politicians/ bureaucrats.
COM Complexity of Decision Problems
-see e.g. Yildrim (2004) , Khan and Schroder (2009) It is well known from psychological and computer science literature that complex problems are more diffi cult to process than simple problems (e.g. Gorla and Ramakrishnan, 1997) . Complex decision problems are characteristic for example by the following features: a) they consist of many partial subproblems; b) these subproblems are interrelated in such a fashion, that it is not possible to solve them in parallel; c) a variety of analytical and decision tools (o en requiring special expertise) must be employed to tackle the subproblems. However, a simplifi ed measure of (or rather a proxy for) problem complexity is possible: Tadelis (2012) defi nes project complexity as how expensive it is to provide a complete set of plans and contingencies.
INF Availability of Relevant Information
-see e.g. Deng et al. (2003) , Evenett and Hoekman (2005) , Fearon (2009) When there is high INF, important information, such as the criteria and rules for the bidder's decision processes relevant to the particular GT, are available to companies that enter into the tender. Conversely, when INF is low, the competing companies do not possess some of the relevant information (e.g. about the criteria, the decision procedures, deadlines, and/or informal infl uences -if there are any).
SUB Subjectivity of Judgement
-see e.g. Pongpeng and Liston (2003) , Lorentziadis (2010) Subjective judgment is not based on clearly defi ned criteria and correct operations with data. Rather, it employs various heuristics (e.g. availability heuristics) to arrive at conclusions and decisions. This typically leads to erroneous judgement and/ or biased choices. Antecedents and consequences of subjective judgement are widely studied in psychological and behavioral economics literature (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) .
FUZ Criteria Fuzziness
-see e.g. Saen (2006) , Lorentziadis (2010) Highly fuzzy criteria can be interpreted in many ways (e.g. "the company must be experienced in the area"), while crisp criteria usually allow only one or a small number of interpretations.
COS Monitoring Costs
-see e.g. Calvo and Wellisz (1978) , Bac (1996) High monitoring costs mean that relatively many resources are needed to monitor the procurement process (and vice versa for low COS). Among the reasons for high COS are for instance: a) complexity of the GT under observation; b) the monitoring procedures are not well suited for the GT at hand (e.g. they are too detailed, which can lead to unnecesary monitoring steps); c) the monitoring procedures are not suffi ciently implemented within
II: Qualitative model of GTs represented by set of pair-wise relations among variables
Variables Variables
No 
is a set of independent variables X and the set Q Q  {EFF, INV, BIA and COR} (13) is the set of objective functions (see (7)).
Qualitative model of GTs
The following set of pairwise relations, see Fig. 1 , is inspired by the following papers: Greenstein (1993) , Mattoo (1996) , Auriol (2006) , Ahlin and Bose (2007) , Khan and Schroder (2009) , as well as studies quoted above in (11)) and many dialogues with a team of experts. We consulted the experts about what variables and interrelations to include into the model. They were MBA students at Brno University of Technology with experience with GTs and the authors of Wouters (2011) and Režňáková et al. (in press a, b) .
The qualitative model is represented by the following set of relations (see Tab. II). See Fig. 1 in section 2.1 for the respective shapes (such as "21", "24"). M_+ represents positive proportinality and M_− represents negative proportionality (see (5)).
The model presented in Tab. II was partially developed by a team of experts. If a consensus was unreachable then the relevant second derivatives were not incorporated and qualitative direct (M_+) and indirect (M_−) proportionalities were used instead.
SCENARIOS
The set of 7 scenarios -see Tab III -is generated using so ware described in Vícha and Dohnal (2008a) . Diff erent qualitative problems can be easily solved using the set of scenarios which represent a complete description of all possible behaviors.
The scenarios obtained could be interpreted according to the qualitative vector optimization method described in section 2.2. The nature of two of the objective functions (EFF, INV) requires maximization, whereas two other objective functions (BIA, COR) require minimization. Hence, there are two relatively favorable scenarios, scenarios 1 and 2, and two relatively unfavorable ones, scenarios 6 and 7. Scenarios 3-5 are relatively neutral, scenario 3 being preferable to scenario 4, which in turn is better than scenario 5.
For example, since we want EFF and INV to be maximized and BIA and COR to be minimized, scenarios 1 and 2 are highly desirable, because the objective functions Q (see (13)) increase or decrease accordingly if independent variables X (see (12)) follow the qualitative pattern given in those scenarios. As is apparent from Tab. III (scenarios 1, 2), it is necessary to increase control (CON), decrease contradictions in rules (DIC), eliminate fuzzy criteria (FUZ), enable arbitrage of orders from superiors by expert opinions (EXP), reduce the role of subjective judgment in making choices (SUB), reduce the complexity of decision problems (COM) -for example by dividing a tender into several smaller tenders, increase the availability of information (INF) and reduce monitoring costs (COS) to reach a desirable state.
Possible transitions among scenarios
Additionally, using so ware described in Vícha and Dohnal (2008a) we were able to determine that it is possible to switch from scenario 2 to scenario 4 or 5, from scenario 3 to scenario 1, from scenario 4 to scenario 1 or 7, from scenario 5 to scenario 7, and from scenario 6 to scenario 3 or 4 (see Fig. 2 ). The transition rules employed in this analysis are described in section 2.3 and in Vícha and Dohnal (2008b) .
An important fi nding in the analysis of possible transitions is that "favorable" scenario 2 has an inherent danger of degenerating into "neutral" scenarios 4 or 5, where 5 further degenerates into unfavorable scenario 7 (4 can switch to 7, but also to favorable scenario 1). Another important fi nding is that "unfavorable" scenario 6 tends to move towards favorable scenario 1 via scenarios 3 or 4. Finally, the supposedly "neutral" scenario 5 can switch only to unfavorable scenario 7, which means that policy makers should avoid the states of variables characteristic for scenario 5 (i.e. for example stagnation of monitoring costs, stable complexity of decision problems and stable contradictions in rules with tendency to increase on the one hand, and stable information availability and stagnating arbitrage by expertise with a declining tendency on the other hand -see Tab. II).
CONCLUSION
Qualitative approach has much to off er when complex and partially vague problems, such as GT decision making, are examined. A qualitative, i.e. information non-intensive, model of factors important for effi cient and unbiased GT decision making was outlined. A formal tool for dealing with data of non numerical nature was employed to generate seven possible scenarios and eight possible transitions among them. Desirable and undesirable scenarios and the respective characteristic trends of all included variables were identifi ed. Programs that aim at optimizing GT decision making might use the suggestions off ered here profi tably.
The present model is defi nitely not the only alternative. Many modifi cations, upgrades and extensions are possible. The paper presents just methodology and a simple model as a demonstration.
The main advantages of our qualitative model are: • No numerical values of constants and parameters are needed. • The set of possible solutions (scenarios) is complete, i.e. there cannot be any other qualitative scenarios that are not generated by the qualitative model. • Similar models can be generated using diff erent sets of variables. It is relatively easy to integrate individual models, or to use just a subset of such an integration to build new models, fi ne-tuned to the practical or theoretical issues at hand. 
SUMMARY
The paper presents a simple formalized qualitative model (FQM) of government tenders (GTs). Qualitative models use just three values: Positive/Increasing, Zero/Constant and Negative/Decreasing. Such quantifi ers of trends are the least information intensive. Qualitative models can be useful, since GT evaluation o en includes such goals as e.g. effi ciency of public purchasing, and variables as e.g. availability of relevant information or subjectivity of judgment, that are diffi cult to quantify. Hence, a signifi cant fraction of available information about GTs is not of numerical nature, e.g. if availability of relevant information is decreasing then effi ciency of public purchasing is decreasing as well. Such equationless relations are studied in this paper. Another reason for FQM development is that GTs represent a highly multidimensional problem. FQMs are well suited for tackling complex multidimensional tasks, such as GT, since many variables can be included in a FQM. A qualitative model of the function F(Goals, Variables) is developed in this paper. The model has four goal functions, eight variables, and 39 equationless relations. The model is solved and seven solutions, i.e. scenarios are obtained. All qualitative states, including fi rst and second qualitative derivatives with respect to time, of all variables are specifi ed for each scenario. Any unsteady state behavior of GT model is described by its transitional oriented graph. There are eight possible transitions among seven scenarios. The analysis of transitions shows when it is possible to switch from a desirable to an undesirable scenario (and vice versa), which is of importance for decision/policy makers. The main advantages of FQMs are: 1) No numerical values of constants and parameters are needed in the model development. 2) The set of possible solutions (scenarios and transitions) is complete, i.e. there cannot be any other qualitative scenarios that are not generated by the qualitative model. 3) Similar models can be generated using diff erent sets of variables. It is relatively easy to integrate individual models, or to use just a subset of such an integration to build new models, fi ne-tuned to the practical or theoretical issues at hand. No a priori knowledge of qualitative modeling is required on the reader's part.
